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The heart of insurance—what enables insurance to function—is risk aversion.
Insurance transactions occur because policyholders prefer the certainty of suffering
a small loss—the amount of an insurance premium—to the risk of suffering a larger
loss.1 They are therefore willing to pay premiums that exceed the expected value of
the individual risks that they pose. Insurers undertake to cover these risks and,
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1. K ENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 3 (6th
ed. 2015).
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through diversification and the law of averages, the whole risk is smaller than the
sum of its parts.
It follows from the fact that potential policyholders are risk averse that
sometimes they are also averse to the risk that insurance covering loss will not be
available or, even if insurance is available, will not be reliable. Potential policyholders
could rationally be willing to pay a premium to ensure that insurance against risks
to which they are averse is available and that any insurance that is available is reliable.
The guaranteed renewal protection and prohibitions on medical underwriting
embodied in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),2 for example, can be understood to
provide precisely this kind of insurance. I will call the protection that may be
obtained by paying a premium, or an additional premium, to enhance the availability
or reliability of coverage “insurance insurance.”3
As I will show below, administrative and judicial regulation is sometimes
directed at providing this additional protection. It makes sense, therefore, to think
of administrative and judicial regulation as—among other things—providing
insurance insurance. Regulation, however, is not costless, but often raises the price
of insurance. The increased premiums, if any, that policyholders are charged as a
result of this form of regulation are what they pay for insurance insurance.
Because demand for insurance is elastic, however, whether it is possible for
regulation to generate insurance insurance depends on the interaction of two
factors: the magnitude of potential policyholders’ risk aversion and the amount of
the additional “premium” that must be paid for the insurance insurance that
regulation generates. In addition, regulation may increase the risk of adverse
selection and moral hazard, thereby further increasing costs and the resulting gap
between potential policyholders’ risk aversion and the price that insurers must
charge for insurance insurance.
In this Article I engage in something of a mental experiment in order to see
where this way of thinking about the potential insurance insurance features of the
regulation of insurance might take us. For purposes of the Article, the notion of
insurance insurance is more nearly a heuristic than a theory about insurance
coverage or insurance regulation. I use the notion as a lens through which to bring
certain inherent limits on the regulatory enterprise from the background to the
foreground. If this results in a richer understanding of the subject, then the mental
experiment will have been a success.
Part I briefly sets the stage by discussing the role of insurance within the set
of mechanisms that may be used to handle the risk of loss. Part II identifies and
analyzes a variety of different forms of existing regulation, seeking to show how
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-4 (2012).
3. I first saw this phrase in a cartoon by Jack Ziegler—“And, for what we don’t cover, there’s
insurance insurance.” See Nathan Heller, Bay Watched, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/10/14/bay-watched; Jack Ziegler, New Yorker Cartoon,
CONDÉ NAST COLLECTION, http://www.condenaststore.com/-sp/And-for-what-we-don-t-coverthere-s-insurance-insurance-New-Yorker-Cartoon-Prints_i9896618_.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).

Abraham_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

2015]

RISK AVERSION

8/9/2015 11:05 AM

515

they can be understood to generate insurance insurance. Part III then turns to five
aspects of the availability and reliability of insurance about which policyholders also
are risk averse and for which insurance insurance would therefore in principle be
desirable. This Part shows why these aspects of insurance insurance are more
difficult for administrative and judicial regulation to address, analyzing how and why
this is the case.
I.

THE PLACE OF INSURANCE INSURANCE IN THE RISK-MANAGING UNIVERSE

Risk—the possibility of suffering a loss—is pervasive. A wide variety of
devices “manage” risk.4 I use this term because it reflects the fact that these devices
not only take different forms, but also that the devices operate in different ways.
Some reduce risk or avoid it.5 Others, including insurance, transfer or spread risk.6
The paradox of insurance is that, by reducing the loss that may be suffered by
any given insured party, insurance may increase the actual risk of loss. This is the
familiar moral hazard that can be created by insurance.7 Insurance and risk reduction
can be complements rather than substitutes, however, when insurance is devised so
as to combat moral hazard.8 In a perfect world, insurance would cover only those
risks that could not be cost-effectively eliminated through other means. Then
insureds would have optimal incentives to eliminate risk, and insurance would be
available only for the residue of risk that remained.
Three factors, cutting in different directions, render this ideal impossible to
achieve. First, insurance is able, only imperfectly, to combat moral hazard. Some
losses that might otherwise have been cost-effectively avoided, therefore, occur
nonetheless. Insurance then costs more than it would cost if it could perfectly
combat moral hazard. As a result, there is less demand for insurance than there
would be in the absence of moral hazard, and less insurance is purchased.
Second, potential insureds posing higher than average risk may
disproportionately seek insurance. If insurers cannot identify and charge these
applicants accordingly, then adverse selection may occur and lower risk insureds
may disproportionately decline to purchase insurance.9 This too reduces demand
for insurance.
Third, however, insureds are risk averse. They are therefore willing to pay
premiums that exceed the expected value of the risk they pose. This means that
there is more demand for insurance than there would be in the absence of risk
aversion. As a consequence, the reduction in demand resulting from moral hazard
and adverse selection may be completely or partially offset by risk aversion.
All this may affect insurance insurance in the following ways. On the one hand,
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See A LEXANDER J. MCNEIL ET AL., QUANTITATIVE RISK M ANAGEMENT 471–93 (2005).
See id.
See id.
See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 7.
Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541 (1979).
See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 6–7.

Abraham_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

516

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/9/2015 11:05 AM

[Vol. 5:513

regulatory efforts to make insurance more available or reliable may sometimes
increase moral hazard and adverse selection, thereby undermining existing
insurance and making risk reduction, or risk spreading through other means, more
attractive than they would otherwise be. For example, those who might otherwise
have insured may hedge,10 increase their risk of bankruptcy,11 or rely more heavily
on publicly provided insurance or risk protection instead of private insurance.12
There is even some very limited express insurance insurance sold in the market.13
On the other hand, risk aversion may be sufficient to partially or completely
overcome the moral hazard and adverse selection generated by a particular form of
regulation, thereby making insurance in the face of such regulation feasible, despite
the increased risk of moral hazard and adverse selection. The question will then be
whether these effects are worth tolerating in order to generate insurance insurance.
II. FORMS OF INSURANCE INSURANCE
A variety of administrative and judicial forms of regulation can be understood
as directed at assuring the availability14 or reliability of insurance.
A. Administrative Regulation
In a sense, much administrative regulation is a form of insurance. Regulation
of the securities markets, public utilities, and consumer products, for example, helps
to assure the availability and reliability of these objects of regulation. Regulation is
likely to raise the cost of the products in question. This increased cost, often paid
10. A hedge is a transaction that creates the possibility that a gain will be produced whenever a
loss occurs. If the price of wheat rises whenever there is a flood, then the risk of flood damage can be
hedged by purchasing wheat futures. A hedge of this sort does not literally reduce the probability that
a loss will occur, but it does reduce the net economic effect when the loss occurs. In this sense, hedging
resembles both risk reduction and risk spreading.
11. In effect, a party that becomes insolvent because it suffers a loss or losses spreads the loss
among its creditors. Each creditor who is unable to recover the full amount of the debt owed to it
(including tort creditors) bears a share of the shortfall that results from the loss. Unlike other forms of
risk transfer or spreading, however, which occur pre-loss, transfer or spreading through bankruptcy
occurs post-loss.
12. The form of spreading that takes place through this approach varies. If benefits—for
example, provided by FEMA in the event of disaster—are paid out of general revenues, then the loss
is spread among all taxpayers. On the other hand, if those provided benefits have paid premiums for
government insurance—as in the case of Medicare, for example—then risk is spread among all
premium payers, though not necessarily in proportion to premiums paid, because premium structures
themselves may anticipate some intergenerational spreading.
13. Insurance broker Swett & Crawford offers “Claims Dispute Insurance” on behalf of NAS
Insurance Services and Lloyd’s of London. Susanne Sclafane, New Product Tackles Uninsured Risk of
Coverage Denial, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (June 30, 2008), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/
2008/06/30/new-product-tackles-uninsured-risk-of-coverage-denials. “We know that wrongful
coverage denials occur in our industry,” said Swett & Crawford managing director Jason White. Id.
Insurance against wrongful denials is needed because businesses that are wrongfully denied coverage
by their insurers often cannot find lawyers to take their cases; even simple cases can cost $50,000 to
litigate and complicated cases twice that, making litigation financially impractical. Id.
14. Because affordability may be considered an aspect of availability, I do not consider
affordability separately in what follows.
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by purchasers in the form of a higher price, is effectively an insurance premium
designed to render these products more available or reliable.
Similarly, much administrative regulation of insurance is designed at some
level to ensure the availability or reliability of insurance. This occurs in three ways.
First, regulation may directly mandate that insurance be available. Statutorily created
residual market mechanisms, such as auto liability insurance assigned risk plans and
joint underwriting associations in a number of different fields, help to fill gaps in
market-provided insurance, typically subject to premium ceilings.15 At the federal
level, the ACA requires health insurers selling coverage on insurance exchanges to
accept all applications, places severe limits on medical underwriting, and mandates
guaranteed renewability.16 All of these devices provide insurance insurance, not
simply by making insurance available in the first instance, but also by protecting
insureds against the risk that there will be changes in their insurability after their
insurance policies expire.
Second, regulation may provide insurance insurance indirectly by setting
standards or threatening fines or penalties in a manner that increases the probability
that insurance will be available or reliable. For example, solvency regulation makes
it more likely that insurers will have the resources to pay valid claims.17 State-enacted
versions of the Model Unfair Insurance Practices Act enable the imposition of
penalties on insurers that engage in a pattern of misleading marketing or claims
processing conduct.18 The threat of penalties creates incentives for insurers to
process claims fairly. Statutes awarding extracontractual damages to individual
claimants for “bad faith” claims handling have the same effect.19
Third, regulation may provide for an alternative source of payment in the
event that insurance does not pay a valid claim. State insurance guaranty funds, for
example, ensure that insurance provided even by an insolvent insurer is secure, up
to a statutory maximum per claim, by providing claimants payment out of the
fund.20
B. Common Law Judicial Regulation
The common law of insurance consists of a vast body of doctrines. I do not
contend that the purpose of a substantial percentage of these doctrines is to provide
insurance insurance. Nonetheless, there are important doctrines that have precisely
this effect. I will discuss four such doctrines here.
The first three doctrines create insurance insurance indirectly by threatening
insurers with liability in a manner that makes insurance more reliable. For example,
15. See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 149–50.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, -4 (2012).
17. See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 113–16.
18. Id. at 147.
19. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
170 (5th ed. 2012).
20. See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 122–23.
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the imposition of liability for extracontractual damages on insurers for bad faith
denial of claims creates an incentive for insurers to ensure that they do not
wrongfully deny coverage claims.21 This makes insurance more reliable. Indeed,
because liability for a multiple of the amount due under a policy may be imposed in
a bad faith suit, insurers probably pay some marginal claims that are not in fact
covered. The result of this doctrine therefore is not only to provide a version of
insurance insurance but in doing so also to extend what amounts to coverage to
some noncovered claims.
A second doctrine that has the effect of ensuring the reliability of coverage is
the rule—adopted in a series of jurisdictions—that breach of the duty to defend
estops the insurer from denying coverage of claims that should have been
defended.22 The threat that the insurer will have to pay uncovered claims if it
wrongfully refuses to defend surely induces insurers to defend some claims that they
would not otherwise defend. The effect of the rule is therefore to ensure that the
defense insurance provided by liability insurance policies is actually available.
A third doctrine that promotes reliable insurance is the liability insurer’s duty
to settle. Under this doctrine, a liability insurer that rejects a reasonable offer to
settle for a sum that falls within the limits of liability of its policy is liable for the full
amount of any ensuing judgment against its insured, including any portion of the
judgment that exceeds the policy’s limits of liability.23 The threat of above-limits
liability surely induces insurers to accept some offers to settle that they would not
otherwise accept, thus making the insurance against liability that it provides more
reliable.
My fourth example is a doctrine that directly helps to assure the availability of
insurance. This is contra proferentem, a canon of construction mandating that
ambiguous insurance policy language be interpreted against the drafter. Since the
drafter of insurance policies is almost always the insurer, for practical purposes this
means that ambiguous policy language is construed in favor of coverage.24 The
obvious consequence of the doctrine is to make coverage more secure whenever it
is reasonably debatable whether the policy provides it. This is, in effect, insurance
insurance.
I have provided this selective list of features of administrative and judicial
regulation of insurance in order to demonstrate that these forms of regulation—
and probably others that I have not identified—can readily be understood to create,
or attempt to create, insurance insurance. Proper assessment of this positive thesis
regarding the phenomenon of insurance insurance, however, also requires an
understanding of the limits of regulation designed to provide insurance insurance.
In the following Part, I make a start at providing such an understanding by

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 93.
Id. at 586–87.
Id. at 614–15.
Id. at 41.
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identifying five respects in which there are severe limits of the possibility of
insurance insurance.
III. FIVE LIMITS ON INSURANCE INSURANCE
The insight behind the notion of insurance insurance is that, because insureds
are risk averse, they are averse to the risk that insurance they seek may be unavailable
or unreliable. They may therefore wish insurance of their insurance, not only in the
ways I identified in Part I, but in other ways as well. In this Part, I analyze five ways
that insureds may be risk averse about insurance, but which generate challenges that
make providing insurance insurance difficult or impossible. Such difficulties make
regulation designed to generate these forms of insurance insurance difficult as well.
A. Unpredictable Risk
Insurance thrives on statistical predictability. Risks whose frequency and
severity are unpredictable therefore are more difficult to insure than predictable
risks. Yet potential insureds are likely to be at least as averse to unpredictable as to
predictable risks. Consequently, in theory, insurance against the risk that a risk may
be unpredictable and therefore difficult to insure might be desirable.
Risks that may be unpredictable to individual insured parties can be insured
when insurers can predict the aggregate risk of loss posed by those in their insurance
pools. In the absence of data regarding total risk, selling insurance is more like
gambling than insuring. In principle, however, even comparatively unpredictable
risks should be insurable, as long as insureds are sufficiently more averse to them
than insurers, whose capacity to diversify risk should make them less averse to
unpredictable risk than any individual insured.
It is precisely because of policyholders’ risk aversion, however, that this is not
necessarily or always the case. Insurers who cover an unpredictable risk are
vulnerable to insolvency. And policyholders naturally are risk averse regarding the
possibility of an insurer’s insolvency. The more unpredictable the risk an insurer
might be willing to cover, the less attractive that insurance will be to policyholders
because of the insurer’s insolvency risk.
Insurers might include an unpredictability surcharge in their premiums in
order to reduce their risk of insolvency, but this cuts two ways. On the one hand,
the additional assets produced by the surcharge reduce the risk of insolvency. On
the other hand, coverage will be less attractive to policyholders to the extent that
premiums are higher because they include an unpredictability surcharge.
Unpredictability may therefore create a gap between the premiums insurers must
charge and the premiums policyholders are willing to pay, thus rendering
unpredictable risks uninsurable in practice. Voluntarily offered insurance of
unpredictable risks may therefore not be workable. For the same reason, mandating
that insurers offer insurance against a risk or risks that are unpredictable will not
necessarily mean that policyholders will purchase that coverage.
In contrast, although mandating both that insurers offer and policyholders
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purchase coverage will result in the sale of coverage, such a mandate may have
undesirable side effects. First, potential policyholders may violate the purchase
mandate, either escaping enforcement or paying whatever fine or penalty is imposed
for violation. Some car owners do not purchase liability insurance, despite a
requirement that they do so. The ACA expressly permits paying a tax penalty for
noncompliance with the individual mandate to purchase health insurance.25 Second,
insurers may be permitted or attempt to charge sufficiently high premiums that
policyholders balk at paying them and demand rate regulation that artificially
depresses premiums, thus increasing insolvency risk. Alternatively, premiums may
be permitted to rise, and policyholders may decrease their involvement in activities
that are subject to coverage in order to minimize or avoid paying the premiums in
question. Obstetricians required by hospitals to purchase malpractice insurance may
cease delivering babies, for example.
The foregoing analysis assumes that the risk of insurer insolvency is not
cushioned by the prospect of financial backup. In theory, financial backup might
make it more feasible for insurers to cover unpredictable risks because of the
assurance that the prospect of such backup would provide to policyholders
purchasing the coverage. But in practice that has been the case only to a limited
extent. There is a system of state-based guaranty funds to which solvent insurers
contribute in the event of an insurer’s insolvency.26 The fund then pays the claims
of the insolvent insurer. But these funds have limited application and comparatively
low limits on the amount of a claim that is payable by the fund.27 The result is that
risk-averse potential policyholders are not guaranteed that insurance of
unpredictable risks will be fully paid in the event that the insurer covering the risk
becomes insolvent.
The backup protection provided by guaranty funds could be expanded so as
to reduce policyholders’ concern about the solvency of individual insurers that
covered unpredictable risks. But this very expansion would increase the exposure
of insurers that did not cover unpredictable risks to the possibility of insolvency.
Guaranty fund protection puts the assets of noninsolvent insurers behind insolvent
insurers. The effect of expanding guaranty fund protection, therefore, would be to
diversify the risk of insolvency resulting from individual insurers covering
unpredictable risks across the entire market. But to the extent that all insurers
covered the same unpredictable risk or risks, these risks would likely be correlated
and diversification would be defeated.
Reinsurance is an alternative method of spreading the risk of any given
insurer’s insolvency to the global financial markets. But reinsurance is almost always
incomplete. No reinsurer will cover all of a particular risk. Rather, reinsurance
typically covers a quota share (percentage) of an insurer’s exposure under a policy
25. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(3) (2012).
26. The National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds: Supporting a System of Policyholder Protection,
NCIGF, http://ncigf.org/ [http://perma.cc/3TA3-5CKP] (last visited July 12, 2015).
27. See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 122–23.
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or set of policies, or it covers all exposure excess of a particular monetary exposure
under a policy or set of policies, up to a specified limit of liability.28 The result is
that all unpredictable risk under a particular policy or set of policies usually cannot
and could not be reinsured. Reinsurance therefore cannot eliminate the risk of an
insurer’s insolvency. In any event, reinsurers themselves face the risk of insolvency
when they reinsure unpredictable risks. Policyholders of fully reinsured insurers
therefore cannot count on the solvency of reinsurers, though the more broadly an
insurer’s coverage responsibility is spread among a succession or reinsurance and
retrocession, the more diversified is the risk of insolvency. If all insurers cover
unpredictable risk and reinsure a significant portion of that risk, however, then the
risk of insolvency is likely to be correlated, and the assurance that the presence of
reinsurance would otherwise provide policyholder would be diminished or
eliminated.
Perhaps more importantly, reinsurance can provide policyholders with
reassurance that insurers have diversified their risk of insolvency only if information
regarding the availability of reinsurance of the risk to particular insurers is publicly
available. Without the information necessary to reassure prospective policyholders,
they will still be reluctant to pay the premiums that insurers would have to charge
in order to cover unpredictable risk. Some reinsurance information is publicly
available in the form of submissions of financial information made by individual
insurers to state insurance commissioners.29 But this tends to be insufficiently
detailed for this purpose. It is available at most by line of insurance, without the
level of particularity that would be necessary to reassure individual potential
policyholders. In my experience, individual insurers otherwise guard reinsurance
information fairly closely in order to shield the information from litigants in
coverage disputes. The result is that the assurance that might be provided by more
transparent reinsurance information is absent.
Finally, insurance of unpredictable risks can be securitized through devices
such as catastrophe bonds.30 Insurers covering a risk can sell bonds that pay
investors unless loss exceeding an index or other proxy for a specified level of
insured loss occurs. If there are enough such bonds sold covering different,
uncorrelated losses, then investors should be able to diversify their “coverage” of
these unpredictable but uncorrelated risks.31 In this way, the risk of unpredictable
loss can be spread through the global financial markets.
This possibility suggests how far it could be necessary to go in order to cover
a substantial amount of unpredictable risk. Compared to its multitrillion dollar

28. DANIEL W. GERBER ET AL., 7 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION
§ 71.02[4] (2014).
29. See, e.g., Reinsurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Nov. 2014), http://web.archive.org/web/2015
0423071225/http://www.iii.org/issue-update/reinsurance [http://perma.cc/L7DJ-AUKB].
30. J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, Convergence of Insurance and Financial Markets: Hybrid and
Securitized Risk-Transfer Solutions, 76 J. RISK & INS. 493, 494 (2009).
31. Id.
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potential, the market for catastrophe bonds, which has gotten off the ground only
in recent decades, has been minuscule.32 Whether at some point it will more
substantially address unpredictable risk is an open question. In the meantime,
however, providing insurance insurance in this area will pose a very significant
challenge.
B. Reclassification Risk
One of the risks that insurance purchasers face is that their risk of loss, and
therefore premiums for future coverage, will increase. Risk-averse parties could wish
to insure against this “reclassification risk,”33 perhaps in the form of guaranteed
renewable insurance. For example, manufacturers with products liability insurance
might want to insure against the risk that a product they market will turn out to
cause a disease that the product previously was not known to cause, thereby
increasing their risk levels. Drivers with auto liability insurance might want to insure
against the risk that the incidence of auto accidents in the area where they live will
increase—perhaps because of increased population density—thereby increasing
their risk levels. And homeowners might want to insure against the risk that climate
change will increase their risk of incurring damage from hurricane-force wind.
Three forms of insurance currently cover reclassification risk in this fashion
through what amounts to guaranty renewability. Life insurers and long-term care
insurers commit to renewing policies for specified, extended periods—often twenty
or more years—as long as the policyholder pays predetermined premiums. In doing
so, the policyholder shifts to the insurer the risk that his or her health status—and
therefore his or her risk of dying or of needing long-term care—will change during
the period of guaranteed renewability.
In health insurance, as I noted in Part I, the ACA mandates guaranteed
renewal of health insurance.34 In addition, the ACA prohibits medical
underwriting—with the exception of basing premiums on age, territory of
residence, tobacco use, and participation in a “wellness program”—and risk
classification based on health status.35 As a consequence, health insurers bear
virtually all the risk that a policyholder’s health status will change over time. This
was far from the case, however, prior to the enactment of the ACA.36 It might even

32. Id. at 516–17.
33. Kenneth S. Abraham & Pierre-André Chiappori, Classification Risk and Its Regulation, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., forthcoming 2015).
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-4 (2012).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, -4.
36. HIPPA required health insurers to renew policies that were subject to this law, but imposed
no limits on what insures could charge for renewals. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41. And there were few
restrictions on medical underwriting or risk classification based on health status. It was my observation
that some state laws were more restrictive, and some health insurers voluntarily guaranteed renewal,
but at most there was a patchwork quilt of protections that did not amount to general, guaranteed
renewability.
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be said that one of the principal purposes of the ACA is to ensure that health
insurance covers reclassification risk.
In other lines of insurance, however, the challenge of offering coverage of
reclassification risk, or of legally requiring coverage of reclassification risk, is
substantial. A series of factors places limits on the insurability of reclassification risk.
1.

Moral Hazard

Some of the risks that insurance covers are partly within the control of
policyholders. A driver can influence his propensity to cause accidents by exercising
greater care, by driving fewer miles, or by doing both. A homeowner with a leaky
roof can influence the risk that his home will be damaged by fire by replacing the
roof with fire-resistant material. It would not be in the interest of policyholders or
insurers to insure the risk that these, and the many other risks that are wholly or
partly within the control of policyholders, will change. There would be too much
moral hazard associated with such insurance.
But increase in some risks is either against the interest of policyholders or
largely beyond their control. The most obvious example is change in health status.
Becoming injured or sick is not in the interest of policyholders. Some people are
more careful with their health than others, but in general people try to avoid injury
and illness. Moreover, many health risks are not in people’s control at all. The risk
that I will develop a brain tumor is outside my control. It is no surprise then that
reclassification risk is covered by life insurance, long-term care insurance, and health
insurance subject to the ACA. The question is why insurers have not identified other
risks that are not subject to moral hazard and offered coverage of reclassification
risk in connection with these risks. Additional explanations are therefore necessary.
2.

Unpredictability

In the previous Section, I noted the difficulties associated with insuring against
unpredictable risks. The magnitude of the risk changes that could be involved in
insuring reclassification risk would sometimes be extremely difficult to predict.
Moreover, the longer the period of time over which renewability was guaranteed,
the greater the prediction difficulties insurers would encounter. Without a workable
means of determining what premium to charge for covering this risk, insurers would
be taking a shot in the dark. The more reclassification risk they covered, or—what
amounts to nearly the same thing—the longer the period of time during which they
covered reclassification risk, the more they would be risking severe unprofitability
or insolvency.
As in covering unpredictable risks generally, the tendency of insurers covering
reclassification risk, especially long term reclassification risk, would therefore be to
add a surcharge to premiums to cushion them against unpredictable contingency.
The higher the premiums charged, however, the more averse to unpredictable risk
potential insureds must be in order to find insurance attractive.
The situations in which reclassification risk is covered help to bear out these
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points. In life insurance there is only one risk insured—the risk of death. Insurers’
long experience with and detailed statistics regarding mortality rates make the
predictions necessary to provide guaranteed life insurance to an individual over a
period of decades completely feasible. And guaranteed renewability of health
insurance under the ACA is feasible because, as I indicated earlier, this legislation
prohibits most risk classification.37 With virtually no risk classification permitted,
there is virtually no reclassification risk and therefore little or no unpredictability of
operationally relevant risk changes.
Other lines of insurance do not fit the life or health insurance patterns. For
example, physicians, attorneys, and other professionals face career-long liability
insurance reclassification risk. Malpractice insurance was once dominated by
occurrence coverage, under which coverage is “triggered,” or activated, by the
occurrence of bodily injury or property damage during the policy period, no matter
when a suit alleging liability for this injury or damage is brought.38 This provided
coverage of “long-tail” liability.39 In providing such coverage, the insurer effectively
undertook to cover the risk of long-term change in the incidence and magnitude of
malpractice liability. For practical purposes, this was insurance against
reclassification risk based on difficult-to-predict legal and economic change.
As soon as the rate of legal and economic change became less predictable in
the mid-1970s, malpractice insurers shifted from occurrence to claims-made
coverage, which insures liability only for claims made during the policy period.40
The move to claims made thereby shifted back to policyholders most of the
reclassification risk that occurrence policies had previously covered. For analogous
reasons—the difficulty of predicting the magnitude and rate of change in long-tail
toxic tort, products, and pollution liability, the same phenomenon occurred in
Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance in the mid-1980s.41 Through policy
revisions, insurers have attempted to curtail the amount of long-tail liability covered
by CGL insurance policies.42
3.

Correlated Risk

A third reason that insurers do not offer—and insurance law cannot effectively
mandate that insurance of reclassification risk be offered—is that much such risk is
correlated. There are any number of correlated reclassification risks; some examples
include changes in the scope of tort liability, climate change, and increased auto
accident rates in a particular territory or among a particular class of policyholders.
Change in mortality rates is also correlated and therefore a potential threat to life
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41a.
38. KENNETH S. A BRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 170–71 (5th ed. 2010).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 160.
42. In addition to selling claims-made policies, these include the “absolute” pollution exclusion
and the “Montrose” clause, which attempts to preclude triggering multiple successive CGL insurance
policies. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 439, sec. I(1)(c), at 441, sec. I(2)(f ).
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insurers. But over the past 150 years life expectancies have increased, so the
correlation has benefitted life insurers, since the result has been that payouts have
been extended beyond the time when the life insurers had predicted they would be
due.
Consequently, if there was to be insurance against reclassification risk, it would
have to be defined so as not to include correlated risks. General guaranteed renewal,
however, would cover renewed insurance of all risks that might otherwise have been
reclassified, whether correlated or not. For this reason, for any line of insurance
subject to significantly correlated reclassification risk, guaranteed renewability
would not be feasible. Rather, specification of which reclassification risks were and
were not covered or guaranteed renewable would be necessary.
The extent to which this would be feasible, however, is unclear. Perhaps
specifying and covering a few major reclassification risks would be feasible. But
providing an extensive list of covered and excluded reclassification risks in standardform insurance policies would be cumbersome and undesirable.
4.

Adverse Selection

Efforts to insure reclassification risk also would be plagued by a particular sort
of adverse selection. Policies that were guaranteed renewable across the board or
that insured particular reclassification risks would be disproportionately purchased
by those who believe they are at above-average risk of experiencing increased risk
levels. And those who believe they are at below-average risk of experiencing
increased risk levels, or believe that their risk levels will decline, would
disproportionately decline to purchase reclassification coverage. Moreover, even if
there were a mandate that coverage of reclassification risk be provided automatically,
parties whose risk levels did not increase over time might be able to save money by
switching insurers. These insurers would have to provide the parties reclassification
coverage going forward but would not have to charge the parties the same premium
rates that they had been paying their previous insurers.43
Life insurers face an analogous problem even though life insurance is
guaranteed renewable.44 In any given group of policyholders who purchase longterm life insurance, those who experience adverse changes in their health status are
more likely to continue to pay for their life insurance each year, whereas those who
remain healthy are less likely to continue to pay their annual insurance bills. Those
in this latter group have “lapsed.” The lapse rate is partly a reflection of this sort of
adverse selection, and the prospect that lapses will occur is something life insurers
must take into account in setting premiums for long-term insurance. Only the risk
aversion of even healthy policyholders prevents life insurance from unraveling for
this reason.

43.
44.

See Abraham & Chiappori, supra note 33, at 15.
See TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 201–02 (3d ed. 2013).
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Inadequate Risk Aversion and Consequent Insufficient Demand

Despite all the obstacles I have just discussed, in theory, there might
nonetheless be possible gains in social utility if insurers rather than policyholders
shouldered some reclassification risk. But for this to be the case, policyholder
demand resulting from risk aversion would have to dominate insurers’ reluctance
and resulting increased premiums to insure that risk. The fact that most
policyholders have not in their experience suffered enormously from
reclassifications renders this unlikely as a general matter. In my experience, based
on years of observation, large premium increases for policy renewals usually do not
occur. Policyholders therefore probably are not willing to pay what insurers would
charge to insure reclassification risk, or more such coverage would be offered. Most
ordinary individuals probably are not sufficiently concerned about future increases
in their auto or homeowners insurance premiums to want coverage against the risk
that their increases would be substantial. Indeed, insurers typically sell only one-year
policies, and policyholders seem to exhibit little or no demand for policies of longer
duration. The inference that there is a gap between what policyholders would pay
for longer-term coverage or for other some measure of protection against
reclassification risk and what insurance would have to charge for such protection
seems strong. This may not be an obstacle to covering reclassification risk in
principle, but in practice it seems to have been a significant obstacle.
C. Coverage Uncertainty
A number of the regulatory devices discussed in Part I address the reliability
of insurance coverage. A related concern for insureds is that the incapacity of
language to perfectly convey meaning and intention results in uncertainty about the
scope of coverage provided by insurance policies. One of the risks associated with
buying insurance is therefore that particular losses will not be covered. Of course,
there is a vast universe of risks that are not covered by any particular insurance
policy. Homeowners insurance does not cover collision damage to a car; auto
liability insurance does not cover medical malpractice liability.
On the other hand, in connection with any insurance policy there is a range of
losses regarding whose coverage ordinary individuals, and sometimes even
sophisticated businesses, would reasonably be uncertain. What kinds of water
damage and tree damage does my homeowner’s policy cover and exclude? If my
child throws something out the window of my car while it is moving, is any resulting
liability covered? If my company is ordered to contribute to the cost of cleaning up
the local landfill, does my CGL insurance policy cover this cost?
The possibility that certain potentially insured losses actually are not covered
by an insurance policy is itself something about which policyholders in the aggregate
would naturally be risk averse. This should create an opportunity for insurance
against the risk of not being insured against the set of risks whose coverage is
uncertain.
Because the uncertainty problem arises from the infirmity of language,
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however, uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated with additional language.
Any insurance against the risk of noninsurance would itself be subject to an
analogous sort of secondary uncertainty as to the scope of the coverage it provided
and so on. To the extent that insurers are risk averse regarding coverage uncertainty,
they can purchase reinsurance that partially protects them. Reinsurance typically
circumvents some of the uncertainty problem by providing that the reinsurer shall
“follow the fortunes” of the insurer. Such a provision requires that if the insurer
pays the policyholder, then the reinsurer pays the insurer up to the amount of
promised reinsurance. But of course reinsurance contracts are subject to some
uncertainty risk themselves. This is a problem that neither insurance nor insurance
law can solve directly, although the problem is mitigated by the doctrine of contra
proferentem, as I described in Part I.
There is little reason to suppose that any individual judicial interpretation
directly reduces policyholders’ uncertainty about the scope of coverage they have.
Insurance law surely does not translate into policyholder understandings in that way.
But over time judicial decisions reduce the amount of coverage uncertainty on the
part of the agents, brokers, and lawyers who communicate with policyholders about
the scope of their coverage. And this process probably gives policyholders greater
confidence that the scope of the coverage they have purchased is determinate, even
if policyholders do not know exactly what the boundaries of coverage are in any
given case. Moreover, the doctrine also has at least some effect on the drafting of
policy language in the first instance. Because insurers can anticipate the application
of contra proferentem, they have an incentive to draft provisions that are clearer than
they might otherwise be in order to avoid application of the doctrine. This, too,
reduces uncertainty.
Admittedly, it is not possible for an insurer drafting a policy, or the parties to
a coverage dispute after the policy has been issued, to predict with certainty whether
a particular policy provision will be considered ambiguous if the provision has not
already been authoritatively interpreted. But this uncertainty over whether contra
proferentem will be applied is no greater than the uncertainty about how an ambiguous
provision would be interpreted in the absence of the doctrine. The doctrine does
not eliminate all coverage uncertainty. But the net effect of the doctrine probably is
to create greater rather than less certainty about the scope of coverage.
Nonetheless, an irreducible quantum of coverage uncertainty will always
remain and will always be uninsurable. Insurance insurance cannot fully solve the
problem.
D. Coverage Unavailability
One of the principal functions of markets is to satisfy preferences. But both
the breadth and intensity of preferences influence which preferences markets can
satisfy. Shoes are made in half sizes because, although some people’s feet would fit
better in shoes made in quarter sizes, there is not enough demand for quarter sizes.
There are not enough people willing to pay enough to warrant the cost of mass
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producing shoes in quarter sizes. Therefore, only those who can afford to pay $1000
or more for custom-made shoes can have them.
There are analogous barriers to satisfying preferences for insurance. One of
the principal determinants of the demand for coverage is the degree of potential
policyholders’ risk aversion. If there is insufficient risk aversion, then insurance will
not be available. That may be the case for a number of reasons. First, there may be
insufficient risk aversion to support the sale of insurance either because of the
underlying character or personality of individuals or because they have incomplete
information about the risk in question.
Second, if the risk in question has never been insured before, then insurers
may have limited or no actuarial data on which to base their premium calculations.
In such situations insurers will add larger-than-usual contingency factors to
premiums and may therefore charge higher premiums than they would charge if
they had better data about the risk in question. But potential policyholders’ risk
aversion may be insufficient to yield demand for coverage at this higher price.
Third, there may not be enough risk-averse potential policyholders to support
the development of insurance against a risk. When there are not enough people
willing to purchase insurance of a particular risk to permit insurers to spread the
risk across a large enough number of policyholders, risk-transfer transactions will
not have all the characteristics of insurance. Under such circumstances, insuring the
risk in question is more like entrepreneurship or venture capital investing than
insuring. If there are only a few people or entities facing the risk of suffering a
comparatively large risk, then the risk may be handled in one of those domains. On
the other hand, when there is a fairly widespread risk of suffering a comparatively
small loss, and there is a prospect that demand will eventually be substantial enough,
insurers may begin to offer coverage anyway. That is how innovation in insurance
often occurs.
When this does not occur and insurance against a risk is considered desirable
as a matter of policy, insurance law has several options. The first is to mandate
purchase of insurance against the risk in question. This approach is rare, but not
unheard of. For example, most states require that registered owners of motor
vehicles not only purchase liability insurance but also uninsured motorists (UM)
insurance.45 There is almost certainly sufficient independent demand for auto
liability insurance, but that is probably not true of UM insurance. I doubt that most
people have even heard of UM insurance.
A second approach to the problem of insufficient risk aversion is what in
recent scholarship on incentive creation has been called a “nudge.”46 This approach
provides insurance unless a potential policyholder opts out. For example, a few
states require that UM insurance be provided to anyone who purchases auto liability

45. See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 700.
46. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND H APPINESS (2008).
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insurance unless the purchaser declines UM coverage.47 A nudge of this sort helps
to overcome the limit on insurability resulting from what would otherwise be
insufficient risk aversion on the part of potential policyholders.
Another sort of nudge focuses on insurers rather than policyholders.
Interestingly, the doctrine requiring that ambiguous policy provisions be interpreted
in favor of coverage may be viewed as an effort to promote the satisfaction of
diverse preferences by creating possible incentives for insurers to offer coverage
alternatives. When a policy provision is held to be ambiguous, insurers have four
choices. First, they can redraft the provision to provide unambiguously the broader
coverage. Second, they can retain the provision in their policies. Even if insurers do
not redraft the provision to provide unambiguously for the broader coverage,
insurers acting in good faith should assess claims based on the judicially adopted
interpretation. However, the ambiguous language of the provision may deter some
insureds from making claims, as it may have done before the provision was held to
be ambiguous. In any event, in both situations the preference of some policyholders,
or potential policyholders, for the narrower coverage is not satisfied. All
policyholders receive and pay for the broader coverage, even if some would prefer
the narrower coverage.
Under a third approach, insurers can redraft the provision so that it
unambiguously provides narrower coverage, possibly lowering premiums because
of the clarification. In this situation as well, preference diversity is not served
because the preference of policyholders or potential policyholders who prefer the
broader coverage is not satisfied. All policyholders receive only the narrower
coverage, although they may pay less than they were previously paying.
Finally, insurers can redraft and offer a choice between unambiguously
broader and unambiguously narrower coverage. Only in such a situation is there
greater satisfaction of preferences as a result of holding a policy provision
ambiguous. But the question is how frequently insurers, or some of them, would
adopt this approach. If insurers could have profited from offering policyholders a
choice between broader and narrower coverage, then in a properly operating market
they would already have been doing so. It follows either that one or more flaws in
the market had been preventing this or that there are insufficiently diverse
preferences for coverage to warrant providing a choice between broader and
narrower coverage. It is possible, for example, that applicants had assumed they
were receiving the broad coverage and were willing to pay premiums accordingly. A
judicial decision that the policy provision in question is ambiguous, however, would
not alter this state of affairs. Under such circumstances it would not be in the
interest of insurers to dispel applicants’ incorrect assumption. In the extreme case,
insurers would redraft to provide (unambiguously) only the narrower coverage but
continue to charge the same premiums.
It is true that in a properly operating market this could not occur, because
47.

A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 700.
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other insurers would inform applicants accurately, charge lower premiums for
narrower coverage, and expand their market share. But we are assuming here that
the market is not operating properly, for if it were then some insurers would have
been taking the same steps even before a policy provision was declared ambiguous.
It is costly to give applicants choices. The alternatives have to be explained, different
premiums quoted, etc. If this had not been occurring before a judicial decision, then
for the same reason it might not occur after a judicial decision, because it could still
be too costly, given the additional profits (if any) that could be obtained by giving
applicants a choice between broader and narrower coverage, to offer a choice. The
additional profits that could be earned by offering a choice would depend not only
on the cost of explaining the choice but also on the extent of some applicants’ risk
aversion. This would determine how much more at least some applicants were
willing to pay for the broader coverage. If an insufficient percentage of applicants
were willing to pay a sufficiently greater premium for the broader coverage, then a
choice would not be offered.
We thus come up against the limits of the insurability of diverse coverage
preferences. Even a judicial decision declaring a policy provision ambiguous will not
necessarily—perhaps not even often—result in insurers offering policyholders a
choice between unambiguously broader and unambiguously narrow coverage. Some
policyholders who would prefer broader coverage, or some who prefer narrower
coverage, may not be offered this choice.
All this makes the simple point that it is not possible to buy, and is extremely
difficult for regulation to require, that insurance against certain risks be available.
Only under certain demanding conditions will this be possible. It follows that
regulation often will be unable to promote insurance against the risk that coverage
will be unavailable.
E. Risk-Redistribution Risk
Insurance almost always involves risk classification: assessment of the
magnitude of the risk of loss posed by an insured party and the pricing of premiums
in proportion to this risk. In this connection potential insureds face two risks. The
first is the risk of posing a high risk and therefore of being charged a high premium.
The second is the risk of being charged higher premiums than would be actuarially
warranted because of discrimination against the risk group of which one is a
member. The former is distribution risk; the latter is redistribution risk.
Both are risks against which insureds might rationally want insurance
insurance. In fact, the reclassification risk that I discussed above is, in a sense, a
subset of the broader category of distribution, or classification risk, which I have
discussed elsewhere.48 Consequently, here I will discuss redistribution risk.49

48. See Abraham & Chiappori, supra note 33.
49. In fact, when a risk class is being charged more for coverage than another risk class,
eliminating the distinction between the classes is risk redistributional for both classes, though in
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To analyze redistribution risk, we can begin with a baseline: what a particular
group of policyholders would be charged for insurance in the absence of regulatory
intervention. Of course, insurance is at least minimally redistributional even when
not compared to a baseline of nonregulated risk classification. This is because of
the cost and resulting imprecision of classification. For practical purposes, those
who pose a similar but not identical risk are placed in the same class. Within the
class, however, there is always a range of risk posed by different policyholders.50 In
such a situation, risk is redistributed from those at the high end of the risk range to
those whose risk levels are lower. To use an oversimplified and stylized example, if
everyone who poses between a 1 in 100,000 and 1.25 in 100,000 chance of suffering
a loss is charged the same premium, then risk is partially redistributed from those
in the latter group to those in the former group.
Risk redistribution of this sort is a side effect of the economics of risk
classification. Risk classification is cost effective only up to the point at which its
economic benefit to the insurer of further classification is greater than its cost.
Beyond this point, further refinement of risk classes and decreased variance within
classes are not worth the cost involved in achieving them. The result is at least some
risk redistribution with risk classification categories.51
In contrast to these usually modest risk-redistributional side effects of risk
classification undertaken by insurers, insurance law and regulation sometime
prohibit certain forms of risk classification and thereby redistribute risk. State
insurance commissioners have the authority to ensure that rates are not “unfairly
discriminatory,” and state statutes often prohibit the use of specific variables in
pricing insurance.52 Some states, for example, prohibit risk classification based on
race or religion.53 It is likely that, before such classification was prohibited, it did
not have actuarial support and, when it did occur, it occurred because of prejudice.
Prohibiting such classifications simply changes the distribution of risk in that the
prohibitions help to more closely align classification with the probability of loss.
On the other hand, some classifications are prohibited despite their actuarial
soundness, precisely in order to accomplish risk redistribution. A Hawaii statute, for
example, prohibits basing rates for auto insurance in whole or in part—among other
things—on length of driving.54 To the extent that those with limited driving
experience are nevertheless at greater risk of accident involvement, the result is risk
redistribution from those with limited driving experience to those with more
different directions. In the absence of other regulation, the premiums charged one class rise while the
premiums charged the other class fall. We can therefore talk about these two risks together.
50. K ENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 74–75 (1986).
51. Id. at 73.
52. See A BRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 111, 133–35.
53. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
195, 239 (2014) (“[O]nly ten states have forbidden the use of race, national origin, and religion across
all lines of insurance.”).
54. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-207 (West 2008).
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experience. Similarly, some states prohibit auto insurers from risk classifying based
on gender.55 To the extent that women have fewer accidents than men, such a
prohibition redistributes risk from men to women. Regulatory attempts to
accomplish risk redistribution, however, can be undermined by adverse selection,
moral hazard, and—in an especially interesting way—interactions between the two.
1.

Risk Redistribution and Adverse Selection

Ordinarily, adverse selection is the result of asymmetric information. A similar
effect can be produced even when there is symmetric information about risk levels
or insurers possess more information than applicants, however, if insurers are
precluded from using the information they do possess. When a particular risk
classification would accurately reflect policyholders’ risk levels but insurers are
prohibited from using that classification in setting premiums, then applicants whose
premiums would be higher in the absence of the prohibition may disproportionately
seek insurance coverage.56 And those whose premiums would be lower in the
absence of the prohibition may disproportionately not seek coverage.
Insurance law’s capacity to accomplish risk redistribution is thus limited by the
potential for attempts at redistribution to promote adverse selection. The amount
of adverse selection that occurs will be a function of several factors. The first factor
is the degree to which information about risk levels is asymmetric. Obviously, the
more risk-related information insurers are able to obtain about potential
policyholders, the greater insurers’ capacity to identify the risk levels posed by
individual parties, and the greater insurers’ ability to combat adverse selection
through accurate risk classification and pricing.
The second factor is the degree of different policyholders’ risk aversion. The
less risk averse high risk parties are, the less likely they are to disproportionately seek
insurance, even when the insurance is underpriced given their actual risk levels.
Conversely, the more risk averse low-risk parties are, the more likely they are to seek
insurance even when it is overpriced given their actual risk levels. Indeed, to the
extent that risk aversion is part of a cluster of consistent characteristics, it is possible
that high-risk parties will be less risk averse than low-risk parties. The former’s
comparatively lower concern with risk may be part of what makes them pose higher
risk, whereas the latter’s comparatively greater concern with risk may be what makes
them pose lower risk.57 Intuitively, it is plausible that those who are careful behave
55. Avraham et al., supra note 53, at 241, 245.
56. For reasons I noted earlier in discussing classification based on race and religion, the
converse is also the case. When insurers use a classification that does not have actuarial support,
prohibiting use of this classification will result in less adverse selection. Why might insurers engage in
this economically irrational practice? Prejudice is one explanation. For example, hypothetically, insurers
might classify on the basis of race or sexual orientation, either because of animus or because of the
mistaken belief that racial minorities or gays and lesbians pose higher risk than whites or straights.
Prohibiting classification on this basis would tend to neutralize any adverse selection that had been
occurring because of these classification practices.
57. David M. Cutler et al., Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of
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with greater care than others because they are risk averse and that as a result they
have fewer accidents. Similarly, it is intuitively plausible that those who are careless
are less concerned with the possibility of suffering loss and that they therefore have
more accidents. These same greater or lesser degrees of aversion to risk would cause
the former group to seek insurance more than might otherwise be expected and the
latter group to seek insurance less than might otherwise be expected, and for these
differences to partially neutralize any adverse selection that might otherwise have
occurred because of insurers’ inability to identify those in each group.
The third factor affecting adverse selection is the capacity of insurers to offer
coverage choices that may neutralize the selection effect by separating those who
are and are not at high risk of suffering a loss. For example, by offering high and
low deductible alternatives, insurers may be able to differentiate those who are at
greater risk of suffering loss from those who choose the low deductible alternative.58
In view of the capacity of adverse selection to undermine efforts at risk
redistribution, other things being equal we should expect risk-redistributional
regulation to be more feasible in lines of insurance where there is comparatively less
asymmetric information, and—because of risk aversion—demand for coverage is
inelastic. Correspondingly, other things being equal we should expect riskredistributional regulation to be less feasible where there is comparatively more
asymmetric information, and demand for coverage is elastic because there is, in
general, less risk aversion.
Regulatory practices confirm this. Auto insurers have considerable data about
risk levels posed by drivers with different known characteristics. In contrast, in life
insurance some individuals have private information about their mortality risk that
it is more difficult or costly for life insurers to obtain. Further, the more nearly
mandatory the purchase of a particular form of insurance is, the greater the amount
of risk redistribution that can be accomplished within it because the mandate
removes demand elasticity from the equation. Purchasing auto liability insurance is
mandatory, whereas purchasing life insurance is optional. It is no surprise, therefore,
that there is more risk redistributional regulation, in the form of prohibitions on
certain forms of risk classification, in auto liability insurance than in life insurance.59
Similarly, the ACA nominally mandates that virtually all individuals purchase
insurance and effectively prohibits all forms of risk classification other those based
on geography, tobacco use, and age, thus accomplishing very substantial risk
redistribution.60
Insurance, AM. ECON. REV., May 2008, at 157, 160; Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance
Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2011, at 115, 124.
58. This is one of the core insights of the seminal study by Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz,
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON.
629, 632, 634, 637–38 (1976).
59. See Avraham, et al., supra note 53, at 251.
60. Because there is a penalty for failing to purchase coverage that will ordinarily be less than
the cost of coverage itself, it is expected that some low-income healthy people will prefer to pay the
penalty and will purchase coverage only when there health declines.
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Even when insurance is not mandatory and there is considerable risk aversion
and demand elasticity, it may be worth tolerating adverse selection in order to
achieve a particular redistribution of risk. Even if it were shown that race was highly
correlated with risk in a particular line of insurance, I have no doubt that
prohibitions on classification based on race would be maintained. On the other
hand, where concerns about discriminatory classifications are less intense, or there
is less value in a particular risk redistribution, the degree of adverse selection that
could be expected if a particular prohibition were adopted may play a more
important role in assessing the prohibition. After all, the effect of adverse selection
is to produce less insurance for some people and entities than they would otherwise
prefer to purchase. Other things being equal, that is undesirable. In any event, the
potential for adverse selection in a line of insurance, and the degree to which adverse
selection is undesirable, place a constraint on the capacity of insurance law to
effectively promote risk redistribution.
2.

Risk Redistribution and Moral Hazard

One of the devices that insurance uses to mitigate the moral hazard it creates
is experience rating. Under this practice, premiums are geared, among other things,
to a policyholder’s past loss experience. The prospect that future premiums will be
experience rated mitigates moral hazard by creating incentives for policyholders to
avoid loss in the current policy period and thereby avoid paying experience-rated
higher premiums in the future.61
When premiums are risk redistributional, however, the capacity of experience
rating to mitigate moral hazard is reduced. Any given risk classification, whether or
not redistributional, can also be experience rated. But when the base on which
premium rates are built undercharges some policyholders because premiums are risk
redistributional, then the mitigation of moral hazard that is the purpose of
experience rating may be reduced.
The degree to which moral hazard is exacerbated by risk redistribution
depends on the extent to which premiums are risk redistributional to begin with.
To use a simplified example, we can think of future premiums as having two
components—a risk-redistributional component and an experience-rated
component. The smaller the proportion of future premiums that policyholders
anticipate will be experience rated, the less mitigation of moral hazard that will
occur. Conversely, the larger the proportion of future premiums that policyholders
anticipate will be experience rated, the more mitigation of moral hazard that will
occur.
How much room the threat of moral hazard leaves for regulatory risk
redistribution depends on both how much moral hazard is generated by risk
redistribution and how much concern there is about moral hazard. Experience
rating can be increased in order to combat moral hazard, but doing so decreases the
61.

A BRAHAM, supra note 50, at 75.
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amount of risk redistribution that occurs. Alternatively, the degree to which
premiums are risk redistributional can be kept constant, but the amount of
policyholder self-insurance can be increased with larger deductibles, more
coinsurance, or lower monetary limits of liability. Increased use of these devices,
however, effectively decreases the amount of insurance provided to any given
policyholder and therefore reduces the amount of risk redistribution that actually
occurs.
Similarly, just as risk-redistributional considerations vary, so concern about
moral hazard is not monolithic. We might be much more concerned about moral
hazard that increased the risk of bodily injury, for example, than about moral hazard
that increased the risk of property damage. The increased moral hazard that resulted
from risk-redistibutional premiums in connection with the former might therefore
be less acceptable than in connection with the latter.
In short, like adverse selection, the threat of moral hazard may operate as a
constraint on the capacity of insurance regulation to promote risk redistribution.
But the strength of the constraint depends on the significance of the concern about
moral hazard in particular contexts.62
3.

The Interaction of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

The adverse selection and moral hazard produced separately by riskredistributional premiums may also operate synergistically. Potential policyholders
who anticipate that they will incur losses that they could, but will not, avoid are
more likely to seek coverage when premiums are risk redistributional than when
they are not. Conversely, those potential policyholders who anticipate exercising
more control over whether they incur losses than other potential policyholders are
less likely to seek coverage when premiums are risk redistributional. The purchase
of insurance based on moral hazard will thus produce adverse selection.63
Interestingly, however, the adverse selection that might otherwise be produced
in this way by potential moral hazard may sometimes be completely or partially
offset by another phenomenon. Some policyholders are more risk averse than
others. As I indicated earlier, when a group of potential policyholders’ being at low
risk of suffering loss is correlated with their being comparatively risk averse, then
there will be less adverse selection than would otherwise be expected, or even the
reverse—proverse, or propitious selection. The intuition explaining this effect is
that some people who are especially careful are also risk averse. Indeed, that may be
part of the reason they are more careful than others. To the extent that this is the
case, comparatively low-risk potential policyholders will tend disproportionately to
purchase coverage. When this occurs, the space available for risk redistribution is
greater than it would otherwise be, because those who would otherwise tend not to

62. Id.
63. See generally Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance, A M. ECON. REV.,
Feb. 2013, at 178.
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purchase coverage because the redistribution raised their premiums will tend to do
so anyway, and the adverse selection that would otherwise occur will be neutralized.
Similarly, it is possible that some parties who pose an above-average risk of
loss also are comparatively less risk averse than others and therefore seek coverage
at a below-average rate. The intuition explaining this effect is that some people who
are comparatively careless are also less risk averse. To the extent that this is the case,
comparatively high-risk potential policyholders will tend to adversely select less than
might otherwise be expected. This effect would also create more room for risk
redistribution.
In sum, risk redistribution may be undermined when moral hazard leads to
adverse selection. But adverse selection may itself be partially or even wholly offset
when risk averse parties also pose below-average risk, and when those who pose an
above-average risk of loss seek coverage at a lower rate than might otherwise be
expected. When either or both effects occur, potential moral hazard may not lead
to significant adverse selection, and this possible negative effect of risk
redistribution will be reduced or eliminated.

